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1 Introduction 
 
Co-operatives are special. They have two faces, one face is that of a union of 
members, the other looks like an enterprise. Some people see them as a poor man’s 
answer to the fury of free market forces. Others, the true cooperatists, consider them 
as a most effective answer to specific market conditions and an efficient form of 
organization with respect to different interests of many stakeholders. 
The history of co-operatives is impressive. From the well-known, early 
Rochdale pioneers towards our time, a great number of co-operatives or forms of co-
operatives can be perceived.1 Interesting is though the fact that co-operatives have 
changed in a specific way. From small ones in the early days, they grew bigger in 
response to changing conditions in the market and in society. But they changed also in 
character. Especially in agriculture, wherein co-operatives are dominant. Patisson 
(2000) claims that one third of world food production passes through co-operatives. 
This change of character manifests itself in the governance structure and in its public 
appearance, i.e. members do have a less influential position in decision-making and 
co-operatives nowadays behave sometimes like ordinary enterprises. The difference 
between, for instance, a stock listed company like Numico and a co-operative like 
Friesland Dairy Foods are fading away. Their market behaviour is the same, the only 
difference for the outside observer is the two times yearly show of member gatherings 
with the management and the board of directors. However, there are less visible 
differences in terms of objective (high raw product prices, large volume, member 
services, etc.).  
The efficiency of the marketing co-operative versus the conventional firm is 
analyzed in Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) from a governance perspective. The 
marketing co-operative (conventional firm) is efficient when the investments in 
relationship specific assets at the upstream (downstream) stage are more important. 
Hansmann (1996) characterizes a governance structure by decision rights and income 
rights (Hansmann, 1996). Decision rights concern all rights regarding the deployment 
and use of assets, while income rights are rights to receive the benefits and obligations 
to pay the costs that are associated with the use of an asset. This paper addresses some 
aspects of the restructuring of agricultural co-operatives in terms of decision rights. 
The allocation of ownership in Hendrikse and Veerman can be viewed as a 
simple long-term contract. It is simple because it is non-contingent, i.e. it is not 
allowed to make the allocation of authority contingent on the circumstances / results. 
However, richer long-term contracts allow for this possibility. This paper considers 
contingent long-term contracts, where contingent means that the identity of the 
decision maker depends on the circumstances. Another aspect of decision rights is the 
frequency of meetings between the owners and managers of enterprises. This aspect 
will be addressed from a long-term contract perspective as well as loss aversion 
perspective.  
This article regarding the governance and change of co-operatives is organized 
as follows. Section 2 takes stock of the impact of co-operatives. Sections 3 and 4 look 
ahead. Section 3 considers contingent long-term contracts, while section 4 addresses 
the impact of loss aversion. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
                                                          
1 The history of co-operatives does not start with Rochdale. Historians go back to 
ancient times (McBride, 1986). 
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2 Taking Stock 
 
Co-operatives, especially in agriculture have had, during the past century, in 
their different forms an enormous influence in supporting the interests of farmers and 
in serving the public. They have been a success story. For example, in the dairy sector 
in the Netherlands nearly 85% of all processed milk is in the domain of a small 
number of co-operatives. Traditionally there are a number of reasons why co-
operatives have been created; spreading of different kinds of risks, increasing market 
power, economics of scale and scope, and so on. All these reasons are still of interest, 
but during the last twenty years conditions in the market and in society have changed 
drastically. The process of increasing scale was realized by the merging of numerous 
co-operatives. Activities were directed to one and the same goal; scaling up reduces 
costs of processing, overheads, research, and it increases market power. The 
description of this process is as clear as simple as it has been effective. The European 
Agricultural Policy shaped the conditions wherein the co-operatives could along side 
with their members, increase production and also effectively implement the strategy 
of low cost production. Because market conditions were clear, safe and durable, 
investments were at low risks and politicians could be influenced to prolonge 
conditions as they were. So the outside world was well ordered and quite stable from 
the sixties towards the mid eighties. The inside world of co-operatives was relatively 
stable too. Strategy was clear, member’s interests homogeneous and evident. 
Discussions concentrated on questions of realized revenues for he members in view of 
those of the private enterprises and colleague co-operatives. 
The internal drive was straightforward; be better than the others and your 
members will be silent although never satisfied. Now this clear and cosy world has 
changed. From the mid eighties, it became more and more clear that the CAP had to 
be changed in view of budgetary problems, market distortion, and international trade 
hindrance. The basic problem for an industry, how to organise and manage the 
profitable sale of the products to clients, became a reality for the whole agricultural 
sector. Government market interventions in order to stabilise prices at the politically 
desired level were reduced, intervention prices lowered (cereals), productions quota 
proclaimed (dairy), direct income support introduced, and other market regulations 
drastically changed. The focus of the market and price policy of the CAP was changed 
towards more structural means to develop and support agriculture, in specific regions, 
and for specific environmental purposes. 
It is clear that although these measures were directed to solve the political 
problems of the CAP, co-operatives found their world changing fundamentally. We 
will in short sum up the most important changes and analyse what this did to the co-
operatives and their strategic answers. First of all the reaction of co-operatives were 
different in the various sectors of agriculture. Production quota in sugar and milk 
productions generate a different strategic turn than in cereals and animal production. 
Scaling down production capacity and optimisation of processing was the strategic 
answer to the first, an increased focus on a low cost strategy by means of increasing 
scale and merger the answer to the second. But in all this fury of adaptation to 
changing conditions, the focus was still dominant on production and processing, and 
not so much, at least as intensive as necessary, on the demand side of the market. 
Numerous publications stipulated the absolute need for a change of focus from supply 
orientation towards demand orientation. Many politicians suddenly having seen the 
light of the new era, pleaded for radical changes. Managers tried to formulate new 
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strategic options. So nearly everybody realised what was going on, even the 
agricultural producers. But this need to change is very difficult to implement, 
especially for co-operatives, because members interests being dominant, it is needed 
to convince members first in order to be able to do what must be done. But how to 
convince a large number of critical members that is accustomed to a situation of 
relatively stable conditions of the need to change, while these changes do both affect 
their own situation directly as well as that of the co-operative? How to choose 
between the interests of the co-operative in the long run and of the interests of their 
own firm in the short run? 
Secondly, a number of other developments were generated as a consequence of 
this change of orientations. The process of increasing scale that has been effective for 
a period after the war, was intensified and its speed increased strongly. As a 
consequence, the relative homogeneity that had been characteristic of the agricultural 
sector, broke down. The process of winners and losers that had been at work for 
decades and accepted as a fact of life, now speeded up in a very aggressive way. 
Because in a demand oriented market there is only limited place, it is essential to be a 
part of it. Globalisation and the results of changing protection of agriculture enhanced 
this process enormously. As a consequence, differences between farmers grew bigger, 
furthermore the demographic development in agriculture is of importance. Since in 
Western Europe globally speaking more than half of its professionals in agriculture 
are above fifty years of age, and less than half of them has a successor. It is clear that 
where the horizon for elderly people is quite different from that of the younger ones, 
strategic interests are very different. So co-operatives being guided by members are 
facing increasing internal problems about the choice of strategic options. 
Thirdly, market orientation confronted the sector with the needs and demands of 
the modern consumer. In short, it can be stated that the CAP had disconnected the 
producer and its co-operative from the consumer. Producers concentrated on 
production of standard goods of a medium but acceptable quality at the lowest 
possible costs, were confronted with decreasing demand due to market saturation and 
the demand for higher quality. But how can this be met? Theoretically the price 
mechanism will regulate markets and by means of price signals information is 
forwarded from the consumer to the producer. As shown, the CAP frustrated this 
process, but even in more or less liberal markets like potatoes, fruit and vegetables, 
price changes did have limited effects (Van Den Bosch and Veerman 1980, 1983). 
There are two reasons for this inadequacy of this price mechanism perspective. First, 
the theoretical conditions are not perfectly realised. Political intervention means that 
there are two markets, and the rational producers adapt to both of these. Good 
adaptation to the political market means bad adaptation to the commercial market, and 
vice versa. Second and even more interesting, since the dramatic changes in what we 
call nowadays the food chain, prices do play a modest role since other aspects of a 
product are becoming more dominant. Quality of the product, reliability of delivery, 
safety of foods, lowering costs of logistics, food integrity, and sustainability of 
production are the most relevant issues in the mindset of the modern consumer and 
the retail business. So it is necessary as a recent report in the UK stated clearly 
(Farming and Food, 2002) to reconnect the farmer and the consumer. But there is 
more. In view of the changing demands of consumers, especially the increasing 
demand for convenience due to rise in general welfare as well as changing social 
conditions, the value of the product of the farmer and by that his share of the pie has 
decreased towards for some essential products like bread to 5% of the consumer price. 
Alongside the food chain, the added value increases stronger the closer one is to the 
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consumer. The value chain is therefore unfavourable for farmers and also because of a 
(too) late shift in strategic focus for the co-operatives. 
Fourthly, it can be perceived as a result of more general changes in society and 
in the mind of people that intangible elements of social behaviour like solidarity, 
sharing of collective ideals, acceptance of responsibility for collective goals, and a 
preparedness to have a long view, undermine the essential element of the co-operative 
namely: trust. In a sense a co-operative is well-organised trust.2 If the co-operatives 
expand and become more complex, then the heterogeneity increases. This is the threat 
to trust, because conflicting interests are introduced in the membership.3 
Lastly, it is of importance to note that changing preferences and opinions of 
people in our times with respect to agriculture and the ways this sector is handling 
animals, the environment, and our natural resources, forces farmers and their co-
operatives to focus not only on direct market-driven changes as discussed above, but 
also on indirect goals that have to do with good agricultural practice, the production of 
non-marketable goods and services. In short, in trying to meet these kind of demands 
one needs to have a virtuous and not only a valid enterprise. 
In conclusion it can be stated that the challenges for co-operatives are 
fundamental and numerous. Co-operatives have given an essential contribution to 
their members, but are they capable to do so in the future, are they flexible and 
professional enough, will members give way to the managers, will members support 
their co-operatives financially, and so on. Some of these questions will be addressed 
with the help of some theory in the next sections. 
 
3 Contingent decision rights 
 
The rules embedding transactions can be formal as well as informal. The formal 
rules (section 3.1) are represented by the (allocation of) decision rights of an 
incomplete contract, while the informal rules (section 3.2) can be modelled by an 
implicit / relational contract. The performance of formal organizational structures and 
institutions depends importantly on the informal relationships that these structures and 
institutions facilitate, where the informal rules serve to complete the incomplete 
contract. The formal rights of an incomplete contract determine to a certain extent the 
informal agreements which will come into existence, and they are on the other hand 
affected by them. Implicit / relational contracts, i.e. credible informal agreements, 
have to be designed in such a way that the reputation of each party is sufficiently 
important in order to adhere to the informal agreement. It may be optimal to choose 
an organisation’s formal structure because of its effects on informal relationships 
within the firm. Communication plays an important role in this respect (section 3.3) 
 
3.1 Formal versus real authority 
 
An important issue in organizing the enterprise is the allocation of control and 
authority. Standard incomplete contracting indicates that the employee should be the 
owner of the assets when the relationship specific investments of the employee are 
most important (Grossman and Hart, 1986). However, this seems to be at odds with a 
                                                          
2 Recently Fukuyama (1994) pointed out how essential trust is in explaining the welfare development 
of nations.  
3 Hendrikse and Bijman (2002) have addressed the emergence of grower associations from an 
increasing heterogeneity perspective. 
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basic feature of the firm. Crucial to the notion of the firm is the centralization of 
decision making power, i.e. the employer, not the employee, is the owner of the firm. 
Similarly, the core of an agricultural co-operative is member control over the 
infrastructure at the downstream stage. Formal ownership over the downstream assets 
is the essential feature of a co-operative. 
This seems problematic for these governance structures from an efficiency 
perspective when the relationship specific investments of the employee, or the 
relationship specific investments at the downstream stage of a co-operative, are most 
important. However, formal authority does not preclude that this control is delegated 
to another party, e.g. the employee or a professional management. Control over the 
operational activities at the downstream stage by a professional management may be 
efficient when it has superior knowledge regarding final product markets and takes a 
longer term perspective than the members. This way out of the problem requires the 
creation of an additional degree of freedom in the design of governance structure, i.e. 
a distinction is made between formal and informal authority (Baker, e.a., 1999). 
Formal authority resides at the top, whereas informal authority can be either 
centralized or decentralized. So, the efficiency of a relationship may be enhanced by 
giving up some control, i.e. giving real authority away, even though the formal control 
stays at the top (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). 
The distinction between formal and real authority creates an additional 
governance structure: informal authority / contingent control. Informal authority 
entails that the members delegate their formal rights to the professional management 
as long as everything works well, while these rights go back to the members during 
bad times. Despite their large financial stake, farmers should therefore take some 
distance from the affairs / policy of the professional management as long as 
everything goes well. They should limit themselves to the role of investor. Frequent, 
one-sided directives from the members, including financial decisions, frustrate the 
blossoming of the downstream operational activities. Contingent control is 
characterized by decentralized operational activities and financial decisions. Members 
should only use their formal power to direct co-operative decisions during structurally 
bad times.  
Notice that contingent control may be superior to (unconditional or non-
contingent) delegation as well as centralization. It is superior to delegation because 
the professional management is restrained in proposing projects which are bad for the 
members, i.e. they may have superior final product market knowledge, but they need 
to be employed by the co-operative enterprise in order to have access to the co-
operative structure to bring this knowledge to value (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). It is 
superior to centralization because the innovation incentives for the downstream 
professional management are stronger.  
A co-operative may also be superior to a stock listed enterprise due to the 
continuous exchange of information between members, which enables them to 
evaluate the decisions of the professional management better than the many small 
shareholders of stock listed companies. And not only this, the exchange of 
information from the professional management to the members and vice versa can 
create a strong mechanism of effective and quick adaptation to changing market 
conditions. 
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3.2 Trust 
 
Again the allocation of authority in organisations is analyzed when there is a 
divergence of interests between the various stakeholders, but now the formal as well 
as the informal allocation of authority is addressed. Knowledge, and its location, is 
important in analysing the divergence of interests in this setting. The divergence of 
interests between different parties is problematic from a tacit knowledge perspective. 
Knowledge which is personal, implicit, or hard to codify and to express in the 
formality of language, is called tacit knowledge. It is costly to transfer to outside 
parties and usually resides with a limited number of individuals. The complexity of 
the environment and rapid technological change places therefore a premium on 
informal forms of organization in order to bring this tacit knowledge to value, i.e. 
relational forms of organisation may be most useful in complex environments.4 Trust 
plays an important role in these situations. 
The informal aspects of organisations have to be considered together with the 
formal aspects in the design of governance structures (Baker, e.a., 1999, 2002). 
Ownership of assets determines the identity of party having a reputation for good 
behavior, and therefore having the possibility of abusing a good reputation, because 
the party with the decision rights makes a promise to the party without decision rights.  
For example, if the upstream party owns the asset at the downstream stage, then the 
downstream party is an internal division rather than an external buyer. The upstream 
party is interested in receiving high-quality service, and considers providing an 
incentive for the downstream party to deliver high quality by promising to pay a 
bonus to the downstream party if the latter produces a sufficiently high quality. 
Unfortunately, this promise is vulnerable to reneging. The upstream party may simply 
take the final good without paying the downstream party anything. The implicit 
contract has therefore to be such that the downstream party trusts the upstream party 
to pay a bonus for good performance. Similarly, if the downstream party owns the 
asset, then the downstream party is tempted to renege by taking actions that increase 
the value of opportunities elsewhere. The implicit contract must be such that the 
upstream party must trust the downstream party not to hold up the upstream party by 
threatening to sell the output of the asset elsewhere.  
The choice of governance structure is therefore determined by a tradeoff. 
Downstream ownership offers the downstream party bargaining power. This increased 
downstream bargaining power decreases the upstream party’s temptation to renege by 
lowering the payment for the output delivered by the downstream party. However, 
downstream ownership also encourages the downstream party to consider the interests 
of other parties, i.e. improve the bargaining position by inefficient actions, and hence 
may create a temptation for the downstream party to renege. Non-integration is 
optimal when the first consideration is important, while dominance of the second 
consideration favors integration. 
Vertical integration is according to this perspective an efficient response to 
widely varying supply prices. A key difference between relational outsourcing versus 
relational internal procurement is that the good’s value in its alternative use affects the 
reneging decision under relational outsourcing, but not under relational internal 
                                                          
4 Notice that the contingency approach (Burns and Stalker 1961, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Kast and 
Rosenzweig 1979, and many others) implies exactly that a complex and dynamic environment favors 
organic ways of organizing.  
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procurement. Extreme realizations of the supply price undermine the stability of the 
implicit contract when the governance structure relational outsourcing prevails, 
whereas the reneging temptation is independent of the supply price when the 
governance structure relational internal procurement is chosen. Vertical integration 
reduces therefore the temptation to renege when there is substantial uncertainty 
regarding the supply price.     
The most important insight of this section is that the stability of an implicit 
contract (informal rules) depends on the allocation of decision rights (formal rights). 
The allocation of formal rights determines not only the identity of the party 
developing a reputation, but also the costs and benefits of adhering to an informal 
contract. Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) and Hendrikse and Bijman (2002) have 
stressed the importance of specific investments in allocating decision rights. This 
section has added that this allocation determines to a certain extent the emergence of 
informal relationships. The allocation of (formal) decision rights to the party doing the 
specific investments solves his fear for hold-up in a considerable way, but it creates 
also an informal hold-up problem by encouraging to (partly) renege on promises that 
have been made to the other party. 
 
3.3 Communication 
 
‘Professional management’ in co-operatives is chosen based on their expertise 
regarding downstream operational activities. They possess the knowledge to develop 
the downstream agricultural markets. The importance of this knowledge may require 
that the decision rights regarding the downstream operational activities is delegated to 
them in order to bring it to value. However, changing one attribute of the enterprise 
will have an impact on the other attributes (Hendrikse and Veerman, 1997). The 
choice of each of the other attributes has to be aligned with this choice, given the 
prominence of this attribute. One of the other attributes is the communication between 
the members and the professional management. 
An important task of the professional management is communicating with the 
members, because they are still the owners of the co-operative. Having members with 
their farming background and formal authority, and professional management with 
their final product market orientation and real control, in a ‘new’ co-operative 
provides opportunities as well as dangers. Lazear (1999, p C15) observes: ‘Three 
factors determine the gains from putting together diverse teams. The gains from 
diversity are greatest when groups have information sets that are disjoint, that are 
relevant to one another, and that can be learned by the other group at low costs.’ The 
first two factors seem to be satisfied in co-operatives. However, the third factor is 
frequently problematic, because the ‘finite province of meaning’ (Arbnor and Bjerke, 
1997) of the professional management may differ considerably from the finite 
provinces of meaning of the members. Figure 1 presents the different provinces of 
meaning of the various stakeholders of a co-operative, where the prominence of the 
farmers / members in indicated in bold. 
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Figure 1: Intersecting provinces of meaning in an agricultural  
                co-operative 
Coop 
Government 
Others 
Managers
Farmers Consumers
Investors
One way to facilitate the communication between the members and the 
professional management is to appoint a co-operative board consisting of 
representative members. It has the important role of taking care of the communication 
between the members and the professional management. This board has on the one 
hand to explain the policy decisions of the professional management to the members, 
and on the other hand to inform the professional management of the considerations of 
the members. It has to strengthen the common ground (Devlin, 2001). It serves the 
role of an intermediary, which is important in establishing and maintaining trust. Top-
co-operatives have often problems with this because their members are co-operatives, 
which creates too much distance with the farmers. Communication is an essential 
activity in co-operatives, especially because members interests are more and more 
diverse (section 2). In addition to this, a co-operative board can be formed as a 
combination of non-executive (experienced) members and members representing the 
farmers. This secures professional supervision of the management as well as 
members’ dominance on important decisions.   
 
4 Frequency of board meetings 
 
Changes in investment policy, or the change of governance structure, is often 
slow. It is usually delayed, or does not occur at all. This section focuses on the effect 
of the frequency of evaluations in a governance structure on the choice of investment 
projects. Repeated game incentives are highlighted in subsection 4.1, while loss 
aversion is the focus of analysis in subsection 4.2. 
 
4.1 Repeated game incentives 
 
The role of implicit / relational contracts is to utilize the parties’ detailed 
knowledge of their situation to adapt to new contingencies as they arise. This 
knowledge is repeatedly brought to value by the concern for maintaining a reputation 
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for honoring informal agreements. The Folk-theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) 
implies that the stability of an informal agreement depends on the: 
  
- costs and benefits of finishing a relationship; 
- history of the relationship; 
- observability of decisions. 
 
If the benefit of defection is larger than the costs, then it is predicted that the relational 
contract will fall apart. Second, a relationship is hard to restore once it is damaged, i.e. 
recurring relationships are path dependent. The emergence of relational forms of 
organisation, and which ones flourish, depend therefore on the history of prior 
relationships. Finally, the observability of decisions is important for the stability of long-
term relationships. Cheating on implicit agreements becomes more attractive when the 
observability of decisions decreases. This argues for frequent meetings of the general 
assembly in co-operatives in order to discover the professional management’s eventual 
deceitful or incompetent behavior in an early stage. 
 
4.2 Loss aversion 
 
One of the core building blocks of economic theory is expected utility theory 
(regarding consumer behavior). An implicit assumption in expected utility theory is 
that a reference point or frame does not play a role in decision making. No distinction 
is made between profits and losses. An increase in the loss by 10 euros is treated in 
the same way as a decrease in profits by 10 euros. However, a large amount of 
experimental evidence indicates that losses count twice as much as gains in terms of 
valuation (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Reference points, and therefore the 
difference between gains and losses, plays a prominent role in this approach. 
(Cumulative prospect theory focuses on changes in utility, whereas expected utility 
theory is concerned with utility levels.) The utility function shows a kink at the 
reference point, i.e. a loss is not perceived as exactly the opposite of a gain. Loss 
aversion entails that a gain of one euro is not sufficient to compensate a loss of one 
euro. Two euros are needed to compensate a loss of one euro. An example of the 
prominence of loss aversion in co-operatives is that decision rights are not considered 
that important during times when the co-operative is doing well, whereas they are 
highlighted when things go bad.  
Loss aversion has implications for the design of governance structure in terms of 
the frequency of evaluations.5 The co-operative may benefit from fewer meetings of 
the General Assembly. Loss aversion is posed as an explanation. The idea is that 
frequent evaluations are unattractive for farmers with loss aversion, because the value 
of their enterprise may fluctuate too much. Suppose that the co-operative is on 
average attractive, i.e. there is on average a gain. However, sometimes an upswing 
occurs, sometimes a downswing. The problem is that a loss weighs much more than a 
gain in the valuation function of a farmer with loss aversion. Low yield projects are 
chosen instead of high yield projects in order to prevent a loss during the life span of 
the project. The same holds for an employee having to report frequently to his boss. 
Even tough the activities of the employee are high yield in the long run, he still faces 
                                                          
5 Other implications can be formulated regarding the change in the membership of the co-operative  
(Fershtman, 1996), and the speed of organizational change (Hendrikse, 2000).  
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the risk to have to take a loss once in a while. This is unattractive when you have to 
report frequently. The implication is that too much emphasis will be put on preventing 
losses, which results in weaker performance.      
The following example illustrates the line of thought (Benartzi and Thaler, 
1995). Suppose there is a piece-wise linear utility function, where the utility is U(x) = 
x when x is positive, i.e. represents gains, and U(x) = 2.5x when x is negative, i.e. 
represents losses. The loss of one euro is therefore 2.5 times as high as the gain of one 
euro. This specification implies that a proposal will be rejected that consists of 
gaining 200 euros with probability 0.5 and loosing 100 euros with probability 0.5, 
because the expected utility is 0.5*1*200 + 0.5*2.5*(-100) = -25. However, if this 
person is confronted with this proposal repeatedly and evaluates it only once every 
two periods, then this proposal would be accepted. The probability distribution of the 
outcomes over two periods is 400 (100, -200) with probability 0.25 (0.5, 0.25). The 
expected utility is therefore 0.25*1*400 + 0.5*1*100 + 0.25*2.5*(-200) = 25. 
These considerations have consequences for the design of an efficient 
governance structure. A farmer characterized by the above utility function and being a 
member of a co-operative with frequent meetings of the General Assembly, will not 
consider the co-operative enterprise attractive.  The reason is that gains fluctuate 
almost always and the farmer values a decrease 2.5 times as high as an increase. The 
governance implication is that farmers should not too often ask the professional 
management to render account. Professional managers choose more risky, higher 
yield investment projects when they have to report less. Notice that this implication is 
at odds with the implication in section 3.2. The stability of long-term agreements 
increases when the frequency of evaluations increases. This reduces the attractiveness 
of cheating on the informal agreement. A loss aversion perspective argues for 
decreasing the number of evaluations in order to decrease the impact of (probabilistic) 
losses by averaging them with (probabilistic) gains. 
A similar recommendation regarding investment policy is that recently started 
projects should not be allowed to be terminated, i.e. a short-run restraint may be 
beneficial in the long run. A general insight is that persons with loss aversion 
frequently choose higher yield activities when the frequency of evaluations decreases. 
A unique loss becomes less important for the persons involved because the probability 
is large that this will be compensated before the next evaluation when the evaluation 
period is sufficiently large.  
     
5 Conclusion 
 
Agricultural co-operatives have to restructure themselves in order to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the new agricultural and horticultural 
markets. The restructuring of co-operatives may entail transforming the rights and 
obligations of the members, the need for professional management, changing the 
frequency of meetings between owners and managers, and creating understanding by 
and confidence in the relationship with the members. This article has addressed these 
issues by extending the analysis of Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) by considering 
contingent decision rights and the frequency of board meetings.  
Adjustments in other attributes of the co-operative enterprise have to be made in 
order to result in co-operatives being at least as attractive as stock listed companies, 
which is already reality in dairy. Several of these other attributes will concern income 
rights. Examples are financial instruments and internal transfer price and cost sharing 
schemes. Co-operatives may even emerge in other sectors, like environmental co-
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operatives. We hope that this article contributes to the restructuring and design of co-
operatives. 
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